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Silence of the Spam:
Improving the CAN-SPAM Act by
Including an Expanded Private Cause
of Action
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, email spam has become more than just an
annoyance for email users. Unsolicited messages now comprise more
than 95 percent of all email sent worldwide. This costs US businesses
billions of dollars in lost productivity each year. The US Congress
passed the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 to regulate the spam industry.
Unfortunately, data show that spam only increased since the Act's
passage. Part of the reason for this failure is that the Act only
authorizes the Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys general, and
Internet Service Providers to bring action under its provisions. Each of
these authorized entities either lacks the incentive or the resources to
adequately enforce the Act, resulting in little to no reduction of spam.
As a result, email recipients-not spammers-bear the cost of spam.
This Note argues that the Act should incorporate an expanded private
cause of action for email recipients, thereby increasing the enforcement
level. This will deter spam prospectively by shifting the cost of
unsolicited email from the recipient onto the sender.
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"We invite you to come see the 2020 and hear about the
DECSystem-20 family." With that one line, composed in 1978 and sent
to six hundred users of the pre-Internet ARPANET network, spam
was born.' Gary Thurek, the author of this message and marketing
manager of Digital Equipment Corporation, made more than $20
million for his computer company through this solicitation. 2 Almost
immediately, other ARPANET users criticized Thurek for his
unsolicited message. 3
Despite this early start, modern spam4 failed to take off until
April 12, 1994, when two lawyers from Arizona, Laurence Canter and
1. Michael Specter, Damn Spam, NEW YORKER, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2007/08/06/070806fa-fact specter.
2. Id. ARPANET, short for the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, was the
precursor to the modern-day Internet and consisted mainly of government and university
computers. At the time, users numbered only in the thousands, but their addresses were kept in
a central contact list. Thurek, whose company was headquartered in Massachusetts, wanted to
reach the West Coast technology sector to advertise events where DEC's computers would be
demonstrated and sold for roughly $1 million each. The company sold more than twenty
machines, thanks to the message. Id.
3. Id.
4. The term "spam," as applied to unsolicited commercial email, comes from a popular
1970 sketch created and performed by the British comedy troupe, Monty Python. In the sketch, a
group of Vikings continually sings a song containing lyrics consisting solely of the word "spam,"
which drowns out all other conversation, much like how email spam can drown out legitimate
email. Erika H. Kikuchi, Note, Spam in a Box: Amending CAN-SPAM & Aiming Toward a
Global Solution, 10 B.U. J. Sol. & TECH. L. 263, 264 (2004); see also Spam, PYTHONLINE.COM
(2009), http://pythonline.comlyoutubearchive/spam.
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his wife, Martha Siegel, sent a message to twenty million Internet
users offering them immigration services.5 Although the couple's
spam provoked harsh reactions from network users and eventually
resulted in termination of their Internet access by their Internet
Service Provider (ISP), the couple claims to have earned $100,000
from the email.6
In less than two decades since the Canter-Siegel message,
spam has grown to dominate email distribution, now comprising
roughly 76 percent of all email sent worldwide.7 This translates into
ninety-three billion emails sent each day.8 In the United States, spam
accounted for 73.8 percent of all email traffic in October 2011.9 Just
ten years ago, according to Congressional findings, spam comprised
only 7 percent of all email traffic.10 This dramatic increase now
represents more than mere annoyance to average email users. Spam
is a huge burden on commercial entities, with an estimated annual
cost to US businesses of $71 billion in lost productivity." In 2007, the
average business email user received twenty-one spam messages per
day and spent 1.2 percent of his workday identifying and deleting such
messages.' 2 This cost will probably increase as the spam volume
continues to rise both as a percentage of email sent and in real
numbers.13
Spam's impact extends beyond everyday annoyances and lost
worker productivity.14 It has an increasingly detrimental impact on
the environment, using thirty-three terawatt hours globally each
year. 15 This is the amount of energy 2.4 million US homes would use
annually.16 Moreover, spam contributes seventeen million metric tons
5. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TIME, Mar. 18, 2005,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,981132,00.html.
6. Id.
7. COMMTOUCH, INTERNET THREATS TREND REPORT OCTOBER 2011 6 (2011), http://
www.commtouch.com/download/2178.
8. Id.
9. SYMANTEC.CLOUD, OCTOBER 2011 INTELLIGENCE REPORT 7 (Oct. 2011), http://www.
symanteccloud.com/mlireport/SYMCINT-2011-10 OctoberFINAL-en.pdf.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2006).
11. NUCLEUS RESEARCH, INC., Doe. No. H22, SPAM: THE REPEAT OFFENDER 5 (Apr.
2007), http://nucleusresearch.com/research/notes-and-reports/spam-the-repeat-offender (click
"Download").
12. Id. at 1.
13. Cisco SYSTEMS, INC., CIsco 2010 MIDYEAR SECURITY REPORT 30 (2010), http://www.
cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/security annual-report-mid20lO.pdf.
14. MCAFEE, INC., THE CARBON FOOTPRINT OF EMAIL SPAM REPORT (2009), http://
resources.mcafee.com/content/NACarbonFootprintSpam (follow "Submit"; then follow "English
Full 28-Page Report").
15. Id. at 3.
16. See id.
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of the greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, each year.17 This accounts for
0.2 percent of global annual carbon dioxide emissions or the
equivalent of emissions from 1.5 million US homes.18
The private sector responded to the rising tide of spam through
a range of methods and proposals intended to reduce it-most of which
have failed or are otherwise untenable. 19 Approaches include email
postage where customers interested in the service pay a nominal fee,
usually less than one cent, to ensure that the message reaches the
recipient's inbox. 2 0 While these costs are negligible for those sending
legitimate email, spammers sending millions of emails would find the
costs prohibitive. 21 However, this method does not actually stop junk
mail; rather, it ensures that users receive legitimate email.2 2
One common technology-based approach to spam reduction is a
spam filter, which can identify spam before it reaches the intended
recipients' inboxes. 23 Spam generally must pass through multiple
spam filters from the moment it is sent until the time it is received.24
Some filters block messages from known spammers, while other filters
can scan individual emails' content to determine if it is spam.25
However, spammers continually update their methods to fool both
electronic spam filters and end users to ensure that the email not only
reaches the inbox, but also that the user views the message. 26 Often,
this entails using false or misleading information in the subject
headers, sender information, and body to deceive electronic filters and
human recipients. 27
Despite these and other tactics, electronic filtering software
successfully blocks roughly 95 percent of all spam.28 Considering that
17. Id. Sources for energy use and carbon dioxide production include: harvesting
addresses, creating spam campaigns, sending and transmitting spam, receiving spam, storing
the messages, viewing and deleting spam, filtering spam, and searching for legitimate software
miscategorized by spam filters. Id.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., John Soma et al., Spam Still Pays: The Failure of the CAN-SPAM Act of
2003 and Proposed Legal Solutions, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 165, 171-74 (2008) (providing an
overview of proposed non-legal solutions to the spam problem).
20. Id. at 171; MacGregor Campbell, Pay-Per-Email Plan to Beat Spam and Help
Charity, ABC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=8318609.
21. Soma et al., supra note 19, at 171.
22. Id.
23. Adam Hamel, Note, Will the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on
Unsolicited E-mail?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 961, 971-74 (2005).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 973.
26. Id.
27. Div. OF MKTG. PRACTICES, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FALSE CLAIMS IN SPAM 2-12
(Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spamI030429spamreport.pdf.
28. Specter, supra note 1.
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spammers usually get fifteen positive replies for every million spam
messages sent, electronic filtering software merely forces spammers to
increase the number of emails sent. 29 This is a negligible cost for the
sender. 30 This only increases the power burden on servers and other
equipment and forces companies to sink more resources into spam
protection. 31 The burden is further increased on the final spam
filter-the spam recipient-who uses sixteen seconds on average to
determine if a given message is spam. 32 Lastly, concerns linger about
"false positives," email that filtering software incorrectly identifies as
spam.33  This contributes to additional lost time and lowered
productivity resulting from the search for legitimate emails that,
unbeknown to the intended recipient, the server did not deliver. 34
Recognizing that private sector remedies alone failed to stem
spam's rising volume, Congress passed the Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM
Act" or "the Act").35 The Act failed to reduce spam.36 This Note will
argue that in order to better curb the continued propagation and
expansion of unsolicited commercial email (UCE), Congress should
amend the CAN-SPAM Act to allow for a private cause of action by
individual computer users who receive spam. While the Act could
benefit from a myriad of improvements to reduce spam, this Note will
consider only the addition of a private cause of action.
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of CAN-SPAM's
regulatory framework. Part II will discuss why CAN-SPAII's
enforcement provisions failed to curtail spam's growth and why
common tort law does not provide an adequate cause of private action
within the spamming context. Part III will propose an expanded
cause of private action for individual email users as a means to shift
costs-or potential costs-off of the recipient and onto the spammer.
Part IV will conclude by acknowledging that, while an expanded right
of private action is not a silver-bullet solution, it provides a reasonable
first step to combatting spam through established legal mechanisms.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. MCAFEE, supra note 14; NUCLEUS RESEARCH, supra note 11.
32. NUCLEUS RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 2.
33. Saul Hansell, The High, Really High or Incredibly High Cost of Spam, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2003, available at http://www.lexisone.com/balancing/articles/n0O0O3d.html.
34. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
36. Kikuchi, supra note 4; Soma et al., supra note 19.
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT: REGULATION, NOT PROHIBITION
The CAN-SPAM Act recognizes that mass email can play a
significant role in the domestic and global economy.37 In response, the
Act regulates "commercial electronic mail" messages rather than
banning them entirely. 38 Specifically, CAN-SPAM seeks to regulate
email through certain requirements related to content and
transmission and how the sender obtained recipients' email
addresses. 39
A. Regulation through Criminal Liability and Statutory Penalties
The Act enables the US Sentencing Commission to review or
amend penalties and sentencing guidelines when spammers evade
filters or obtain email addresses through "improper means." 4 0 The Act
contains a number of provisions regulating UCE content.4 1  For
instance, email cannot contain false, misleading, or deceptive
information in the "header" or "subject" lines.42 Any commercial email
must contain a functioning return email address or other electronic
mode of contact. 43 Moreover, commercial email senders must include
a valid physical return address within their emails. 44  Each
commercial email must contain a "clear and conspicuous" identifier,
indicating that the message is an advertisement or solicitation.45
Commercial email that contains sexually oriented material must
include a warning in the subject heading that is viewable before
opening the email. 46 Moreover, the email must contain notice of the
opportunity to opt out of future mailings.47 The Act prohibits sending
37. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1) ("[Email's] low cost and global reach make it extremely
convenient and efficient, and offer unique opportunities for the development and growth of
frictionless commerce.").
38. Id. § 7702(2)(a) (defining "commercial electronic mail message" as "any electronic
mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a
commercial product or service (including content on an Internet website operated for a
commercial purpose)").
39. Id. § 7701.
40. Id. § 7703; 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006) (providing penalties for email fraud).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a).
42. Id. § 7704(a)(1)-(2); see also 149 CONG. REC. S15,946 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that the Act bars individuals from forging "header
information," by falsifying information about the origin of the email message and its route
between the sender and the recipient).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3).
44. Id. § 7704(a)(5).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 7704(d).
47. Id. § 7704(a)(5).
[Vol. 14:1:225230
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additional commercial email messages to recipients who already opted
out of receiving additional mailings.48
In addition to its content provisions, the CAN-SPAM Act
regulates the methods spammers use to obtain recipient email
addresses and to create recipient lists. 49  The Act criminalizes
unauthorized access to computers for the purpose of obtaining email
addresses or using others' computers to send email.50 Senders may
not randomly generate email addresses in an attempt to create valid
recipient addresses.5 1 They are further prohibited from using an
automated means to create a multitude of email accounts from which
to send spam.52 Lastly, the Act outlaws relay of commercial email
through a computer or computer network that the sender is
unauthorized to use. 5 3
The Act permits criminal fines and imprisonment for up to five
years for violators of its provisions.54 Given the difficulty of locating
individual spammers, the Act primarily aims at general deterrence
thereby preventing spam from being sent at all.55
B. Enforcement of CAN-SPAM Provisions: Actions by Federal Agencies,
States, and ISPs Only
The CAN-SPAM Act provides that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is the primary enforcement authority for most of
the Act's regulatory provisions.56 The Act also reserves authority for
certain other federal agencies when the particular spam is related to
48. Id. § 7704(a)(4).
49. Id. § 7704(b).
50. Id. § 7703(b)(1)(A)(i).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 7704(b)(2); see also 149 CONG. REc. S15,946-47 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that this provision criminalizes "account churning," a
technique by which spammers register large quantities of email accounts using false information
in order to evade detection by ISP software filters).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(b)(3); see also 149 CONG. REC. S15,947 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (explaining that spammers often hijack IP addresses to "falsely assert
that they have the right to use a block of IP addresses, and obtain an Internet connection for
those addresses" to hide behind them).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1037(b) (2006).
55. See 149 CONG. REC. S13,023 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Wyden)
("[W]e give a role to the State attorneys general, the Internet service providers - when this bill is
signed into law, to bring a handful of actions very quickly to establish that for the first time
there is a real deterrent, there will be real consequences when those big-time spammers try to
exploit our citizens.").
56. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a). The Act directs the FTC to treat a violation of its statutory
provisions as if it were an "unfair or deceptive act or practice proscribed" defined under 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(a)(1)(B), which provides authority to the FTC to promulgate and enforce rules for acts that
affect commerce. Id.
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the work of those agencies.5 7  Additionally, the Act gives the
Department of Justice (DOJ) authority to enforce the Act's criminal
provisions.5 8
In addition to granting broad authority to the FTC, the Act also
grants limited authority to the states through state attorneys
general.59 States may bring civil actions in cases where spammers
send email messages that contain false or misleading information or
include sexually explicit content without the requisite warnings.60
The Act also enables states to enforce the opt-out provisions and the
requirement to include a return email address. 61 States may sue on
behalf of their citizens for injunctive relief.62 Additionally, states may
sue for monetary damages on behalf of their residents. 63 The Act
provides a penalty of $250 per violation, which is defined as "each
separately addressed unlawful message received by or addressed to
such residents." 64 However, the Act limits the total amount that may
be collected to $2 million.6 5 In cases where the states bring legal
action against accused spammers, the FTC retains the right to
intervene.66
While the Act authorizes multiple government entities to
enforce its provisions, the only private parties that may file suit are
ISPs adversely affected by certain CAN-SPAM violations.67 Similar to
the limited causes of action granted to states, the Act allows ISPs to
sue based only on a subset of the provisions on which FTC may bring
action. 68 Specifically, the Act allows ISPs to sue if they can show that
spammers sent email with false header information or "from" lines,
used misleading subject headings, or included sexual content without
the required warnings.69 The Act also provides ISPs a cause of action
if spammers fail to include an opt-out mechanism or continue to send
57. Id. § 7706(b). Other federal agencies that the Act grants authority to include the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, among others. Id.
58. Id. § 7703(c)(2).
59. Id. § 7706(f)(1).
60. Id. § 7706(0(1) (referencing §§ 7704(a)(1)-(2), 7704(d)).
61. Id. § 7706(f)(1) (referencing § 7704(a)(3)-(5)).
62. Id. § 7706(f)(1)(A).
63. Id. § 7706(f)(1)(B).
64. Id. § 7706(f)(3)(A).
65. Id. § 7706(f)(3)(B).
66. Id. § 7706(f)(5).
67. Id. § 7706(g).
68. Id. § 7706(g)(1).
69. Id.
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spam after consumers exercise the opt-out function.70 Depending on
the particular violation, the Act provides for penalties ranging
between twenty-five and one hundred dollars per violation up to a
limit of $1 million.71 The CAN-SPAM Act does not provide a cause of
action to private non-ISP Internet users like individuals or
corporations.72
C. The Do-Not-E-Mail Registry and its Subsequent Rejection
Congress ordered the FTC to produce a feasibility report on the
Do-Not-E-mail Registry and authorized the agency to implement such
a registry if practicable. 73 Congress's interest in the Do-Not-E-mail
Registry was in response to the recently implemented Do-Not-Call
Registry. 74 The Do-Not-Call Registry provides individuals who place
their phone numbers on the list a private cause of action granting
them at least $500 for each call received from uninvited solicitous
callers.75
The Do-Not-E-mail Registry would have given businesses and
individuals the ability to register entire domain names to prevent
receiving spam.76 This Registry may also have served as a vehicle for
a private cause of action for individual spam recipients, not unlike the
Do-Not-Call Registry.77 While the CAN-SPAM Act does not contain
many specific provisions regarding the Do-Not-E-mail Registry's
precise form, it provides considerable discretion to the FTC to develop
an implementation plan.7 8
However, the FTC declined to implement a Do-Not-E-mail
Registry, pointing to the email system's technical limitations and
privacy concerns associated with creating a centralized list of email
70. Id.
71. Id. § 7706(g)(8).
72. See 149 CONG. REC. H12,193 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) ("[Tihere is specific language in the bill limiting this authority to law
enforcement officials or agencies of the State, and it is not the intent of Congress to allow
outsourcing of this truly State function to the plaintiffs bar.").
73. 15 U.S.C. § 7708.
74. See 149 CONG. REC. S13,041 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Pryor)
(noting the similarity between unwanted phone calls and span and the potential for a Do-Not-
Spam Registry).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006).
76. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 14-15 (June 2004) [hereinafter FTC NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf.
77. See 149 CONG. REC. 813,025 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Schumer)
(likening the cause of action in a potential Do-Not-E-mail registry to that of the Do-Not-Call
registry).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 7708(b).
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addresses.79 Specifically, the FTC found that, unlike with phone
callers, email senders could easily alter the header information
associated with the origin of the email.80 This makes it nearly
impossible to locate the sender of potential spam for purposes of
prosecution.81 Moreover, spammers value a centralized list of valid
email addresses because, unlike phone numbers, tracking down or
generating valid email addresses is incredibly difficult. 82 Cognizant of
spammers' desire to obtain such a list, the FTC expressed concerns
about its ability to fully protect the list and ultimately concluded that
a Do-Not-Spam Registry was impracticable without improved
protection mechanisms. 83
D. Preemption of State Spam Laws
The CAN-SPAM Act explicitly preempts state spam statutes,
bringing national spam regulation exclusively under the Act's
regulatory and enforcement framework. 84 Federal preemption of state
spam laws reflects Congress's concern that a patchwork of state laws
neither provides an effective regime to regulate and curb spam nor
appropriately recognizes that spam is an interstate issue that requires
a single regulatory framework.85 The Act does not, however, preempt
other state laws not specific to email that may otherwise be enforced
against spam, including "[s]tate trespass, contract, or tort law."86
Additionally, CAN-SPAM does not preempt state laws that relate to
computer fraud and other types of computer crime.87
79. FTC NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY, supra note 76, at 15-18.
80. Id. at 12-13.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 16-17. The Report notes that spammers may try to generate email addresses
by using "dictionary attacks" that generate random alphanumeric email addresses similarly to
an automatic dialer. Id. at 17. However, dictionary attacks tend to be less successful than an
automatic dialer because of the number of possible alphanumeric combinations that make up an
email addresses compared to the set number of possible phone numbers in existence. Id. As a
result, a large number of valid email addresses would be extremely valuable to spammers. Id.
83. Id. at 18.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2006) ("This Act supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule
of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to
send commercial messages . . . .").
85. Id. §§ 7701(a)(11), 7701(b)(1); see also 149 CONG. REC. S13,023 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
2003) (statement of Sen. Wyden) ("But I believe a State-by-State approach cannot work in this
area. The numerous State laws to date certainly have not put in place a coordinated effort
against spam . .. . What is needed is a uniform, nationwide spam standard to put the spammers
on notice and to empower the consumers to have an enforcement regime consistent with their
reasonable expectations.").
86. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b).
87. Id. § 7707(b)(2)(B) (providing that the Act does not preempt "other State laws to the
extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud or computer crime").
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II. CAN-SPAM'S ENFORCEMENT FAILURE: A QUESTION OF ECONOMICS
AND INCENTIVES
While there are numerous possible explanations for why spam
continues to grow, part of the problem stems from the Act's failure to
adequately address the particular costs and incentives of all the
players in the spam industry.88  This failure to recognize the
economics of the spam industry short-circuited Congress's goal in
deterring potential spammers from sending spam in the first place.8 9
During floor debate highlighting the proposed CAN-SPAM bill,
Senator Ron Wyden presciently noted: "It is clear this Congress must
act, but we should make no mistake-unless we can effectively enforce
the laws we write, those laws will have little meaning or deterrent
effect on any would-be purveyor of spam."90 This Part discusses the
economics of the spam industry as a basis for why CAN-SPAM's three
primary enforcement mechanisms-as well as tort and state law not
preempted by CAN-SPAM-failed to sufficiently shift the cost
incentives enough to deter spammers from continuing and increasing
the number of spam messages sent since the Act's passage nearly a
decade ago.91
A. The Economics of the Spam Industry: Low Costs Plus Limited
Attention Spans Equals More Spam
The key difference between email spam on the one hand and
telemarketing and traditional junk mail on the other is that the
marginal cost of sending one email is negligible to the spammer,
whereas telephone and traditional mail involves significant
investment of time and money per message.92 Additionally, the little
cost associated with sending one more email message falls harder on
the recipient than on the spammer. 93 This is called the "recipient
pays" economic paradigm.94 A recipient pays paradigm differs from a
"sender pays" paradigm in that the recipient of the unwanted message
88. Alex C. Kigerl, CAN SPAM Act: An Empirical Analysis, 3 INT'L J. CYBER
CRIMINOLOGY 566, 576 (2009).
89. See supra note 55 (explaining Congressional intent to deter spam through included
statutory mechanisms).
90. 149 CONG. REC. S13,023 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
91. Supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
92. See Robert K. Plice et al., Spam and Beyond: An Information-Economic Analysis of
Unwanted Commercial Messages, 18 J. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPUTING & ELECTRONIC COM. 278,
279 (2008).
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shoulders the economic burden of the last marginal email sent rather
than the emailer.95 This contrasts to other forms of media, which
require larger investments of time and money-through the use of
stamps, long-distance charges, etc.-to send each additional letter or
make each additional phone call.96
This economic paradigm incentivizes spammers to send
increasingly more emails to recipients in the hopes of maximizing
spam profits, which are based on the quantity-not quality-of emails
sent.97 The recipient pays principle leads to poorly targeted emails
often having little connection to the recipients' actual interests
because it is cheaper to send a larger quantity of email than to
conduct market research or otherwise tailor individual messages.98
This de minimis marginal cost, paired with little concern for overall
public image, incentivizes spammers to send as many individual email
messages as possible in order to receive sufficient quantities of
responses to turn a profit.99
Meanwhile, spam recipients pay a disproportionate amount of
time and attention for each marginal email received as compared to
spammers.100 Economists view attention span as a finite resource,
which, if overused by spammers, will result in a depletion of attention
available for each additional spam message. 101 Since the first step in
gaining profit from spam requires that the recipient pay attention to
95. Plice et al., supra note 92, at 279; see also Brett A.S. Martin et al., Email
Advertising: Exploratory Insights from Finland, 43 J. ADVERTISING RES. 293, 293 (2003) (noting
that email costs senders $5 to $7 per thousand emails sent while traditional mail costs $500 to
$700 per thousand units sent); infra note 140 and accompanying text.
96. Martin et al., supra note 95.
97. Kigerl, supra note 88, at 576.
98. Plice et al., supra note 92, at 279.
99. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Aspen Summit:
Cyberspace and the American Dream (Aug. 19, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
030819aspen.shtm ("This shifting of costs encourages inefficiency because the total cost to send
tens of millions of emails, if borne by the spammer, would presumably outweigh the proceeds
that most spam generates. Yet at our Spam Forum, a bulk emailer testified that he could profit
even if his response rate was less than 0.0001%."); see also Oleg V. Pavlov et al., Mitigating the
Tragedy of the Digital Commons: The Problem of Unsolicited Commercial Email, 16 COMM. ASS'N
FOR INFO. Sys. 73, 81 (2005).
100. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
101. Id.; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
Hardin developed the idea of "the tragedy of the commons," which is a situation where multiple
individuals, acting in their own best interests, utilize a free and open common-pool resource in
such a way that the resource eventually becomes depleted through their collective action because
the marginal cost of utilizing one more unit of that resource is negligible to each individual.
Hardin, supra. The quintessential illustration of the tragedy of the commons is a grazing field
that eventually becomes depleted because individual ranchers continually add their cows to the
field at no marginal cost and are therefore not incentivized as individuals to limit the number of
cows sent to graze. Id. Eventually, the field has no grass to offer, putting the ranchers-and their
cows-out of luck. Id.
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the email, spammers send increasingly higher volumes of email in
order to garner a larger share of recipients' attention relative to
competing spammers. 102 Unfortunately, spam-filtering technology,
while preventing the receipt of the vast majority of spam, 103 further
incentivizes spammers to send more email. 104 The few messages that
get through will receive more attention from recipients, leading to
higher response rates and profits per email that circumvents the
automatic filters. 105
Each facet of the spam industry-initial volume sent, limited
time and attention, and even spam control technologies-centers
around the de minimis marginal cost of each email sent and
perversely incentivizes spammers to send increasingly more email.106
For legislation intended to curb spam to be effective, it must shift
more of the financial burden onto spammers by raising the cost of each
marginal email sent. 107 Since spammers are effective only if they send
a sufficient quantity of email messages, generally millions, adding
even a small cost-or potential cost-to each email could dramatically
impact spammers by flipping the incentives associated with sending
each additional email.108
That spam increased since the enactment of the CAN-SPAM
Act suggests that its enforcement provisions did not have the
deterrent effect on spammers that Senator Ron Wyden and Congress
had envisioned. 109 Only 14.3 percent of spam complied with all three
major criteria of the Act during the first full year after its passage,
with compliance dropping to 5.7 percent by 2006.110 This suggests
that spammers recognize the risks of prosecution for non-compliance
with CAN-SPAM are not sufficiently high to shift the costs onto them
and to disincentivize spamming. 111
The FTC, state attorneys general, and ISPs will bring
enforcement actions only when they receive a critical mass of
102. Plice et al., supra note 92, at 279.
103. See supra text accompanying note 28.
104. Pavlov et al., supra note 99, at 81.
105. Id.




110. Galen A. Grimes, Compliance with the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Studying the
Application of the CAN-SPAM Act and its Effect on Controlling Unsolicited Email Messages, 50
COMM. ACM 56, 59 (Feb. 2007). The study defined compliance as: (1) not using a deceptive or
misleading subject line, (2) including the physical address or advertiser, (3) including a
functional opt-out provision within each email, and (4) identifying a sexually explicit message as
such. Id. at 60-61.
111. Kigerl, supra note 88, at 578.
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complaints about noncompliant email from individual spam
recipients. 112 The Act's weak enforcement provisions are the result of
aggressive lobbying by Internet marketing and retail associations
concerned about the stricter laws that many states were developing
and implementing at the time that CAN-SPAM was passed. 113 The
current enforcement provisions, in order to successfully deter spam,
require strengthening so that prosecution and punishment become
more of a reality. The provisions must force spammers to recalculate
the cost of sending spain in order to internalize the risk of defending
against lawsuits for violation of the Act. 1 14
This section will discuss why the three primary enforcement
agents of the CAN-SPAM Act-the FTC, state attorneys general, and
ISPs-have failed to effectively curb the expansion of spam since the
Act's passage.116 Since the Act reserves private causes of action that
sound in common law and state fraud regulation, 16 this section will
also consider why these causes of action may not adequately shift the
cost of sending email onto the senders of spam.
B. FTC Enforcement: Little Enforcement Against a Rising Tide of
Spam
Federal enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act, though consistent,
failed to make any real dent in the growing spam problem. 117 In the
first two years after Congress enacted CAN-SPAM, the federal
government brought only twenty cases.118 Between 2005 and 2007,
112. Rita M. Cain, When Does Preemption Not Really Preempt? The Role of State Law
After CAN-SPAM, 3 ISJLP 751, 768 (2008).
113. See Stefanie Olsen, Ad Groups Lobby for Antispam Law, CNET (Nov. 13, 2003),
http://news.cnet.com/Ad-groups-lobby-for-antispam-law/2100-1024-3-5107059.html (explaining
CAN-SPAM preempted California's stringent "opt-in" law); Andrea Stone, Marketers Trying to
Influence Congress on Spam, USA TODAY (Nov. 10, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2003-11-10-spam-congress.x.htm (noting that industry lobbyists preferred the
Senate's legislation that eventually became CAN-SPAM to other, stricter standards considered
in the House).
114. Kigerl supra note 88, at 578.
115. See infra Part II.B.
116. See supra note 86.
117. Tom Spring, Spam Slayer: FTC's CAN-SPAM Report Card, PCWORLD (Dec. 20,
2005, 8:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/123982/spam slayer-ftcs-canspamreport-card.
html.
118. See Div. OF MKTG. PRACTICES, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, SPAM SUMMIT: THE NEXT
GENERATION OF THREATS AND SOLUTIONS 6 (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 FTC REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/071220spamsummitreport.pdf (noting that "nearly 30
law enforcement actions focusing on the core protections" of the CAN-SPAM Act have been
brought); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS app. 5 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 FTC REPORT], available at
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the FTC and DOJ brought fewer than ten total additional cases. 119
This means that in that two-year period, the federal government
brought, on average, fewer than five additional cases per year.12 0
Light enforcement coincided with a period of an increasing spam
volume, underscoring the inability of just one primary enforcement
agency, the FTC, to adequately confront the spam problem. 121 At the
time of the 2007 FTC Report, the largest single civil penalty was for
$900,000.122 However, the average imposed civil (or criminal) penalty
for violations of the CAN-SPAM law remains unclear. In any case, the
chance that any individual spammer will face an enforcement action is
extremely unlikely given the number of spammers and the low level of
enforcement. 123
C. State-brought Suits: Limited Enforcement with Limited Budgets
In addition to federal action, the Act authorizes state attorneys
general to bring suits against noncompliant spammers. 124 Although
empowering states with a cause of action introduces fifty additional
potential plaintiffs to bring such suits, state attorneys general offices
failed to make CAN-SPAM enforcement a priority.125 In the first two
years after Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act, state attorneys
general brought a total of six cases to enforce the Act's provisions. 126
One of these cases was filed jointly with the FTC, which is included in
the initial twenty cases brought by the FTC as mentioned above,
meaning that states alone filed only five additional cases. 127
The current state budget deficits suggest that state attorneys
general will not be able to increase the already low number of
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/051220canspamrpt.pdf (noting that the FTC brought
twenty cases at the time the Report was released).
119. 2007 FTC REPORT, supra note 118, at 6.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
122. 2007 FTC REPORT, supra note 118, at 7; see also Consent Decree and Order for Civil
Penalties and Injunctive and Other Relief at 7, United States v. Jumpstart Techs., LLC, No. C-
06-2079 (MHP) (N.D Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) (providing for a $900,000 civil penalty).
123. See 2007 FTC REPORT, supra note 118, at 7.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(1) (2006).
125. 2005 FTC REPORT, supra note 118, at app. 7.
126. Id. Three cases were filed in federal court, while an additional three were filed in
state courts. Id. The states filing cases include California, Florida, Massachusetts (2),
Washington, and Texas. Id.
127. 2005 FTC REPORT, supra note 118, at app. 7 (states filing cases include California,
Florida, Massachusetts, Texas and Washington); see also FTC v. Optin Global, Inc., No. C05-
1502 SC, 2005 WL 1027108 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2005) (exemplifying a joint federal and state
prosecution of CAN-SPAM Act violations).
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CAN-SPAM actions. 128 Nationwide state budget shortfalls for fiscal
years 2009 to 2011 totaled over $430 billion. 129 States confronted
these deficits partly through spending cuts to various government
services and agencies. 130 Nonetheless, states will continue to see
budget shortfalls into the foreseeable future, with forty states already
projecting a combined $113 billion deficit through fiscal year 2012.131
If revenue continues to decline, states will continue to cut spending
and services as past budget shortfalls deplete reserve funds. 132
Exacerbating matters, state budgets tend to recover slowly from
recessions, indicating further budget cuts to the offices of state
attorneys general in the future. 133 Some states already identified
budgetary cuts in their offices of the attorney general, which will
further reduce the human and capital resources available for litigating
CAN-SPAM cases. 134
The states' current minimal enforcement of CAN-SPAM, along
with the dismal outlook of state funds, suggests that states will not
pick up the slack in enforcement in the foreseeable future. As a
result, CAN-SPAM's anticipated deterrent effect will not be enough
because the chances of litigation and its attendant civil and criminal
penalties are too low to prompt spammers to factor these risks into
their costs.
D. Internet Service Provider Private Suits: Incentivized Not to Bring
Suit
Despite the commonly accepted proposition that ISPs are the
ideal private plaintiffs to file CAN-SPAM suits because spam burdens
128. Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff & Nicholas Johnson, States Continue to Feel
Recession's Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 6 (June 17, 2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf.
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 6. This total will most likely grow as it does not include the budgets of all fifty
states.
132. Id. at 7.
133. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET UPDATE: NOVEMBER 2010 1
(Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/november2010sbu free.pdf.
134. See, e.g., STATE OF WASH. OFFICE OF ATT'Y GEN., TEN PERCENT GFS REDUCTION,
100-BT-2011-13 (2010), available at http://www.ofm.wa.gov/reductions/2011-13/100.pdf (listing
reductions across state Office of Attorney General). Some states, like Pennsylvania, currently
exempt offices of the state attorney general from funding cuts. State Budget Issues, 2010-2011,
SUNSHINE REV., http://sunshinereview.org/index.php/State-budget issues,-2010-2011 (last
visited Jan. 2, 2011).
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their networks, ISPs have mixed incentives to bring such actions.135
The marginal financial cost of transmitting spam for ISPs is as low, or
lower, than it is for spammers to send email. 136 As a result, the cost of
carrying spam to ISPs, both in economic terms and in terms of server
network stress, tends to be overstated. 137  Courts have begun to
recognize that paucity of evidence supporting the contention that
spain strains network capacity. 138 This renders moot the argument
that ISPs have the primary private motive to sue spammers, thereby
calling into question whether the Act properly incentivizes ISPs to
bring enough suits to deter spam. 139
The Fifth Circuit declared in White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v.
University of Texas at Austin that server efficiency and load "is among
the most chronically over-used and under-substantiated interests
asserted by parties."140  The opinion continues: "declaring server
integrity to be a substantial interest without evidentiary
substantiation might have unforeseen and undesirable ramifications
in other online contexts."1 41 Even if there is an additional cost to ISPs
resulting from the filtering and increased server load associated with
spam, evidence suggests that ISPs just pass that cost-as much as two
dollars per month per user-directly to the consumer. 142
In addition to being a financially neutral "problem" for ISPs,
providers may actually profit from having spam on their servers. The
clearest example of this profiting is when the Internet user pays for
access by-the-minute or has a cap on the amount of data that may be
used for a given period of time. 143 Many rural or poorer Internet users
do not have the unlimited broadband access that urban or wealthier
Internet users have.144 As a result, the time that users spend online
sorting through unwanted spam, when aggregated over many Internet
135. 149 CONG. REC. 813,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. McCain)
("Internet service providers are the businesses caught in the middle, forced every day to draw
distinctions between what they perceive as legitimate email and what is spam.").
136. Soma et al., supra note 19, at 192.
137. Id.; see also Saul Hansell, Totaling Up the Bill for Spam, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/28/business/totaling-up-the-bill-for-spam.html (noting that one
ISP has actually reduced network usage through its spain management system).
138. See e.g., White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 377 n.24
(5th Cir. 2005) (noting that courts are beginning to require better evidence that spain and
unauthorized access physically damages computer networks).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 375.
141. Id. at 377.
142. Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-Based Policy
Approach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 23 (2005).
143. S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 7 (2003).
144. Id.
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users, can translate into profits for ISPs, further reducing their
incentive to go after spammers. 1 4 5
While pay-by-the-minute home Internet access will eventually
give way to unlimited broadband, wireless Internet providers-which
represent a growing segment of ISPs-are moving away from
unlimited mobile access and toward monthly data caps. 1 4 6 Unlike the
traditional unlimited access available on some mobile Internet
devices, plans with data caps charge additional fees when users
exceed the preset limit. 14 7 Screening unwanted spam will cause some
Internet users to exceed these data limits, providing additional
spam-based revenue to ISPs.148
Furthermore, many ISPs, such as America Online and
Microsoft, also host web-based email services that charge advertisers
for allotted online space where they may post banners and other
advertisements. 14 9 The more time users spend on these websites, the
more ISP-based email providers can charge advertisers for that online
space as users click around. 150 Counterintuitively, the time Internet
users spend manually filtering spam on email websites can generate
more money for ISPs.151 Lastly, some ISPs have leveraged the spam
problem directly by packaging additional spam-related software like
filtering and ad-blocking services to consumers in order to engage in
advertising and market differentiation.152
The enforcement provisions in the CAN-SPAM Act assume that
ISPs' incentives for blocking spam align with those of their
customers. 153 The problem is that ISPs do not necessarily have proper
incentives to sue spammers on behalf of their customers because spam
may be economically neutral or even lucrative for ISPs. Online
security systems tend to fail when the party charged with
implementing those systems is not the party that will suffer from such
145. Id.
146. Julia Boorstin, AT&T's New Tiered Pricing: Why & Why Now?, CNBC (June 2,
2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/37471802/ATT-s_NewTiered.PricingWhyWhyNow.
147. Id.
148. See Bambauer, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149. Igor Helman, Note, SPAM-A-Lot: The States' Crusade Against Unsolicited E-mail in
Light of the CAN-SPAMAct and the Overbreadth Doctrine, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1525, 1555 (2009).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hansell, supra note 137.
153. 149 CONG. REC. S13,023 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Wyden) ("[W]e
give a role to ... the Internet service providers ... to bring a handful of actions very quickly to
establish that for the first time there is a real deterrent, there will be real consequences when
those big-time spammers try to exploit our citizens.").
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failure, as is the case with ISPs.15 4 As a result, empowering a private
third party, like an ISP, to protect its customers from spam may not
be the best means to protect consumers as Congress intended. 1 5 An
ISP's own financial stake in maintaining spam nullifies its incentive
to bring suit as often as possible. Similar to the problems associated
with the FTC and the states, it is likely that the risk of litigation will
be insufficient to increase spammers' projected costs of each email.
E. Tort and State Fraud Law: Too Murky to Clearly Deter
While the CAN-SPAM Act provides no private cause of action
for individuals, and simultaneously preempts state spam laws, it
allows individuals to sue under various common law tort theories and
preserves state laws focusing more generally on fraud and
cybercrime. 15 6 However, tort law application in spam cases remains
unreliable and risky for plaintiffs.15 7  Moreover, courts are
unpredictable in determining whether CAN-SPAM exempts particular
state statutes from its express preemption provision.158
The seminal tort case brought against a spammer is Intel
Corporation v. Hamidi.159  In Hamidi, Intel, a computer processor
manufacturer, brought a common law trespass to chattels claim
against Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi, a former Intel employee who
repeatedly sent uninvited scathing email messages through Intel's
mail servers to numerous Intel employees. 160 Relying heavily on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court held that Intel must show
tangible damage to its servers or email system in order to bring a
successful claim-something that Intel could not do since
unauthorized use of the systems do not physically harm them. 161
While the Hamidi decision spawned much commentary and
debate, it is important here for two reasons. First, Hamidi
154. Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 SCIENCE
610, 610 (Oct. 27, 2006).
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 84, 87.
157. Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L.
EcoN. & POL'Y 147, 147 (2005).
158. Compare Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc, 422 F. Supp. 2d 523 (D. Md. 2006)
(holding that CAN-SPAM does not preempt Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act), with
Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
CAN-SPAM preempts an Oklahoma statute regulating commercial email).
159. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). For a more expansive discussion of
Hamidi, see Epstein, supra note 157; see also Steven Kam, Note, Intel Corp v. Hamidi: Trespass
to Chattels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427 (2004).
160. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 299-300.
161. Id.
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underscores the difficulty that courts face in adapting centuries-old
common law to modern technology cases in general and with spam in
particular.162 These types of "legal gymnastics" create confusion
among potential plaintiffs and reduce the chances that they will bring
common law tort actions for issues like spam.163 Secondly, and as a
corollary to the first point, Hamidi's holding that requires proof of
damage to the computer systems sets a high bar for a successful
plaintiff.164 Considering the difficulty in quantifying the cost of spam
to large ISPs with their vast financial resources, 165 proving physical
damage for individual businesses and consumers can be prohibitive. 166
These two facts, combined with the American Rule that
requires each party in a lawsuit to pay his own attorney fees,167
suggest that plaintiffs will not risk a common law suit to bring
spammers into court when the probability of winning is so low.168
Congress recognizes the importance of providing attorney fees in
CAN-SPAM by giving courts the option to assess attorney fees to any
party courts see fit-an option unavailable under tort law.169
Doctrinal confusion and high financial risk dissuades potential
plaintiffs from filing actions,170  short-circuiting the deterrence
impacts of tort and state law. There must be a higher degree of
certainty that the plaintiff will first file a case and then win in order
to raise the perceived costs of sending spam.
Similar to the problems associated with applying tort law to
unwanted spam, state statutory regimes designed to regulate email
fraud remain inconsistently preempted. 171 Thus, a plaintiff must first
show that CAN-SPAM does not preempt the particular state cause of
action and only then may proceed to argue the substance of the case.
Many state anti-fraud laws, if not preempted by CAN-SPAM, require
the plaintiff to prove that the sender knew or should have known that
the recipient lived in the state with the anti-fraud statute.172 Since
162. Adam Mossoff, Spam-Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625, 641-44
(2004) (criticizing court's use of nuisance-type substantial interference with use of property for a
claim rooted in trespass theory, which does not traditionally require such a showing).
163. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 40
(2000).
164. See Cain, supra note 112, at 761 (noting the difficulty in quantifying physical
damage from spam).
165. See supra, Part II.C.
166. Cain, supra note 112, at 761.
167. Alyseka Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
168. Cain, supra note 112, at 761.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(4) (2006).
170. Mossoff, supra note 162, at 641.
171. Supra note 158.
172. Cain, supra note 112, at 764-65.
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email addresses provide no indication of where recipients live, proving
actual knowledge is borderline impossible in the vast majority of
cases.173
As a result, potential plaintiffs find themselves left in a
difficult position. On the one hand, courts may (or may not) find
particular state spam statutes preempted, thereby removing the
private cause of action. On the other hand, those state statutes that
CAN-SPAM does not preempt often require evidentiary showings that
may be nearly impossible to prove. These challenges further
underscore the need for a CAN-SPAM private cause of action for
individuals to seek damages against spammers, because the Act
preempts any statute that could meaningfully deter spammers by
increasing the probability that spammers would be brought to court
and held liable.
III. PRIVATE ACTION To DETER SPAM: ANY ACTION Is GOOD ACTION
The private cause of action, in any of its many forms, primarily
works to increase the deterrence value of statutory enforcement
provisions by enabling larger classes of plaintiffs to bring actions
against violators. 74  Even a weak private enforcement provision
spreads the enforcement authority so broadly that the enlarged
number and diversity of enforcers invites more prosecutorial
innovation and flexibility than a "monopolistic government enforcer
would produce" on its own. 175 Authorizing more potential plaintiffs to
bring suit increases the likelihood that a particular spam offender will
find himself as a defendant in either a civil or criminal case, thereby
shifting additional risk and potential cost onto that violator.176
Bringing additional private actors into the larger CAN-SPAM
enforcement scheme may help remedy the particular challenges and
shortcomings associated with the Act's current enforcement
structure.1 77  Supplementing government action with private
enforcement mechanisms serves to alleviate the financial burden on
limited or dwindling state and federal government resources. 78
173. Id. at 765.
174. Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The
Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action under a Structural ist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 71, 118.
175. William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" is--and Why it
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2152 (2004).
176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
177. Supra Part II.
178. See, e.g., Gregory Huffman, UPL, MDP, MJP: How Irresistible are These Changes?,
65 TEX. B. J. 428, 430 (2002) (discussing Texas's adoption of a private cause of action as a
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Federal agencies recognize the value of private suits in supplementing
government action, thereby reducing the financial burden associated
with enforcing frequently violated statutory regulations like those
implementing the CAN-SPAM Act.179 Moreover, a wider cause of
private action provides a relief valve for enforcement authorities when
those entities authorized to bring legal action are unwilling or unable
to prosecute or pursue such actions, as is the case with ISPs and the
states.180 In fact, Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, a
"bounty" system where the FTC would pay private citizens to pursue
spammers on its behalf. 181
States seeking to limit spam prior to the adoption of
CAN-SPAM recognized the power of a private cause of action. 182 For
example, the California approach authorizes each recipient, defined as
"the addressee of an unsolicited commercial email advertisement," to
bring a civil action to recover either actual damages or liquidated
damages of one thousand dollars for each unsolicited commercial
email up to one million dollars.183  State provisions like these,
designed to deter users from sending spam, led marketing groups to
lobby for CAN-SPAM's adoption and its weak enforcement
provisions.184  This section will consider the potential impact of
various forms of private action on deterring spammers from sending
spam by examining areas of regulatory enforcement that provide for
more expanded private action than does CAN-SPAM.185
replacement for the State's earlier system of exclusive government enforcement for unauthorized
practice of law, which had been ineffective due to budgetary constraints).
179. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT IN
THE 1990'S PROJECT: RECOMMENDATION OF THE ANALYTICAL WORKGROUPS, No. 22E-2000,
5-47-5-48 (1990) ("[T]he availability of citizen suit remedies has served to leverage our scarce
enforcement resources. . . . Moreover, to the extent that the regulated community views citizens
enforcement as unpredictable, an even greater deterrent effect is achieved by the reality of
active, broadly spread citizen suit enforcement as regulates seek to achieve compliance to avoid
not only federal and state prosecution but also to avoid independent citizen enforcement
actions.").
180. Christopher G. Granaghan, Note, Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute,
89 TEX. L. REV. 477, 489 (2010).
181. See 149 CONG. REC. S13,041 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Corzine)
("Creating incentives for private individuals to help track down spammers is likely to
substantially strengthen the enforcement of anti-spam laws. It promises to create an army of
computer geeks who seek out spammers for their and the public's benefit.").
182. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5 (2003) (allowing any "recipient of an
unsolicited commercial email advertisement" a cause of action) (preempted by CAN-SPAM Act).
183. Id.
184. Olsen, supra note 113 (noting that marketing groups were concerned about some
states' stiff legal provisions and therefore preferred Congress's relatively permissive spam bill).
185. Measuring deterrence is fundamentally difficult because it requires predicting an
illegal action and identifying a causal link between a present deterrence approach's impact on
reducing the probability of that illegal action. Christina 0. Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions
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A. The Private Attorney General: Private Standing when the
Government Sits Down
Although the phrase "private attorney general" first made its
way to the US Supreme Court in 1943,186 its usage remains nebulous
and imprecise.187 Nonetheless, for the purposes here, the clearest
definition is "a private citizen working on behalf of public good within
the legal forum."188 This definition coincides with the purposes of the
CAN-SPAM Act, as the compensation available when filing a civil suit,
the "private" part of the phrase, works to incentivize actors to work for
public deterrence of statutory violations, the "attorney general" part of
the phrase.189 This public function by private actors supplements the
public enforcement that has so far failed to deter violations adequately
on its own. 190
Qui tam actions provide the best-known example of the role of
a private attorney general.191 In a qui tam action, a private attorney
appoints himself to enforce those provisions for which qui tam actions
are authorized. 192 After the private attorney brings a case, he must
inform the Attorney General's office, which has the option to replace
the private attorney and take over the case.193 However, if the
Attorney General chooses not to intervene, the private attorney may
continue the qui tam action, incentivized by the fees and additional
proceeds he may keep through bringing a successful case.194
Currently, three statutes in the United States Code include qui tam
provisions. 195 These include the False Claims Act (FCA), the false
marking statute, and a statute intended to protect American Indian
and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 949, 980 (2007).This results
in a very high level of uncertainty. Id.
186. FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
187. Rubenstein, supra note 175, at 2130.
188. Id. at 2134.
189. Id. at 2140.
190. Susan D. Hoppock, Current Development 2006-2007, Enforcing Unauthorized
Practice of Law Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and its Impact on
Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 734 (2007); Granaghan, supra note 180, at
489.
191. The qui tam action may be best known because it has proven to be divisive among
scholars as to its constitutionality and its arguably perverse incentives. Loretta Calvert, The Qui
Tam Provision of the False Claims Act: Congressional Missile or a Net Full of Holes?, 1998 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 435. Qui tam is short for qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur, which means "who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter." Granaghan,
supra note 180, at 488.
192. Rubenstein, supra note 175, at 2145.
193. Id. at 2144.
194. Id.
195. Granaghan, supra note 180, at 499.
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tribes. 196  States are increasingly reliant on qui tam actions to
alleviate burdens imposed by regulatory enforcement. 197
The FCA allows the Attorney General or private attorneys,
known as relators, through a qui tam action, to file actions against
federal contractors believed to be committing fraud against the
government.198 Congress included a qui tam provision in the FCA
because detecting fraud requires specialized knowledge, and the
expanding federal contractor sector impeded the government from
adequately monitoring every government contract.199 Congress
recognized the government's limits in expertise and resources in
finding and prosecuting spammers.200
Between 1986, when Congress added the qui tam provision to
the FCA, and 2004, relators filed 4,704 qui tam lawsuits, through
which they recovered 8.4 billion dollars for the government. 201 During
this time, the average recovery for qui tam actions under the FCA was
1.7 million dollars, while the average government-initiated action
settled for 1.4 million dollars. 202
Similar to federal contractor fraud against the government, two
of the most serious challenges facing spam enforcement are the
difficulty and expense of tracking down individual spammers. 203
However, such a qui tam provision could incentivize a wider group of
people with specialized knowledge about spamming technology and
the spamming business to take action against spammers. 204 In this
way, the federal government and the states benefit because they do
not need to rely as heavily on their own funds to ensure the level of
enforcement necessary to successfully deter spammers from sending
email.205 States have already adopted qui tam provisions to help
196. Id.
197. Broderick, supra note 185, at 956.
198. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). The qui tam provision allows relators to recover up
to 25 percent of the damages as well as reasonable attorney fees. Id.
199. Broderick, supra note 185, at 960-61.
200. See 149 CONG. REC. S13,041 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Corzine)
("The fundamental problem in dealing with spam is enforcement. It is one thing to propose rules
governing emails. But it is often hard for Government officials to track down those who violate
those standards. Spammers typically use multiple email addresses or disguised routing
information to avoid being identified. As a result, finding spammers can take not just real
expertise, but persistence, time, energy and commitment.").
201. Broderick, supra note 185, at 955.
202. Id. at 979.
203. FTC NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY, supra note 76.
204. Qui tam provisions rely on the "common informer" principle, where relators with
particularized knowledge either of the specific statutory violation or the issue will fill the
enforcement gaps left by limited government resources. Broderick, supra note 185, at 960-61.
205. See supra Part IIB.
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relieve the burdens imposed by investigating and prosecuting fraud.206
Internet users will benefit through a larger critical mass of cases
brought on their behalf-something the states have not done.207
B. Citizen Suits: Removing the Middle Man
Citizen suits are in some ways better suited to the spam
problem because qui tam actions are generally used only to recover
compensatory damages on behalf of the government, and not as widely
used to enforce the types of civil and criminal sanctions found in the
CAN-SPAM Act. 2 0 8 Unlike qui tam actions, citizen-suit provisions
grant standing to bring suit against violators, like spammers, to
anyone who can show damages.209  Moreover, citizen suits are
intended to deter bad acting prospectively, not punish reactively, 210
which aligns with the purposes of the CAN-SPAM Act.
Environmental protection remains the pioneering legal area in
which citizen suits are used to supplement government action. 211 For
the most part, these suits have succeeded in helping the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the DOJ enforce
environmental statutes.212 Specifically, the citizen-suit fee recovery
system incentivizes private action among a large group of people
because plaintiffs recover costs and penalties if they prevail in
litigation.213  Citizen-suit actions work to fill in the regulatory
enforcement gaps left by broad regulatory schemes, such as those
related to the environment and to spam.2 14 Such schemes-those
206. For example, Tennessee had a Medicaid qui tam provision that successfully exposed
"significant amounts" of fraud. Broderick, supra note 185, at 996. In fact, the Tennessee Attorney
General has never had to bring a state-initiated action because of the qui tam provisions. Id.
Similarly, Texas recovered all of its Medicaid False Claims Act's $15.8 million through qui tam
actions. Id.
207. See id. at 961.
208. Rubenstein, supra note 175, at 2145.
209. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) ("Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section and section 309(g)(6), any citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf-(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency ....
210. Hoppock, supra 190, at 730.
211. The Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604, was the first environmental statute to
include a citizen suit provision. Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping the Common
Law's Shadow: Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 119, 130 (2001).
212. Jeanette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in
Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 220,
221 (1987).
213. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
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which may involve an unmanageable number of violators-basically
necessitate provisions for citizen suits to supplement government
action.215 That is, citizen-suit provisions reflect the recognition that
some regulated communities are so vast that government enforcement
alone cannot adequately deter statutory violations-a problem
apparent with spam.
The primary challenge associated with environmental citizen
suits is that plaintiffs often have difficulty showing injury, and
therefore lack standing to bring the suit.2 16 If Congress were to add a
private cause of action, a plaintiff would prove standing simply by
showing that he received spam that violated the CAN-SPAM Act.
This is distinguishable from the many environmental cases in which
the court held that the citizen plaintiff failed to show a particularized
injury, given the often-attenuated link between environmental
statutory violations and personal harm.217 Since the harm in spam
cases is already defined in the statute as the receipt of certain forms of
email, the harm is less abstract than the environmental harm or
particularized injury in the environmental statutes. Moreover, the
wider adoption of citizen-suit provisions, when compared with qui tam
provisions, would provide a greater body of decisions from which
Congress can draw to adequately craft effective legislation. 218 To
avoid such issues of standing, Congress could mirror much of the
language used to authorize ISP private causes of action.219
One rejoinder to this argument is that the civil penalties
imposed by the Act are not substantial enough per individual email,
especially if there is not a critical mass of people who would rather
seek a relatively small penalty through expensive litigation than just
delete the email.220 Unlike ISPs, which could bring suit for all the
215. Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV.
339, 374-75 (1990).
216. For a discussion of standing see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
217. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
218. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57-58
(1987), superseded by statute (holding that language of Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision
did not grant standing for wholly past violations and suggesting that Congress clarify the
language). Congress took the Court's advice in the 1990 amendments to the Act. Clean Air Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat 2399 ("PAST VIOLATIONS.-Section 304(a) of the Clean Air
Act is amended by inserting immediately before 'to be in violation' in paragraphs (1) and (3) 'to
have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) . . .
219. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g) (2006).
220. Id. § 7706(f)(3)(A) (providing for a $250 penalty per CAN-SPAM violation); see also
Samuel M. Hill, Small Claimant Class Actions: Deterrence and Due Process Examined, 19 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVoc. 147, 152 ("An additional contention is that if the small claimant class action is
unavailable defendants will be free to violate the law as long as the negative effects are diffused
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individual emails that a particular spammer sends through its
servers, an individual bringing such action would have standing to
bring suit only for that one email received. The current civil penalty is
too low to deter plaintiffs from bringing such action. This would
require massive amounts of plaintiffs to file in order to deter
spammers. Such a critical mass of plaintiffs could put a strain on the
courts due to the amount of potential new litigation.
Given the number of emails sent by spammers, however, class
action suits organized and brought by lawyers incentivized by the
prospect of hefty attorney fees could act as a large deterrent to
spammers. This is especially true if the civil penalty prescribed by
statute is multiplied by the number of individuals in the class. 221
Considering the number of recipients associated with just one mailing
and the fact that all recipients receive the same email violating the
same statute, such a class could easily fulfill the numerosity,
commonality, and typicality elements required for class certification
under the Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 222 In this
way, there would be an increased number of plaintiffs seeking to
pursue spammers. Thus, the higher cost of legal defense, statutory
fees, and even criminal incarceration would force some spammers to
exit the industry or at the very least reduce the number of emails sent,
since each email would mean one additional potential plaintiff.
C. The Limits of Domestic Action
A direct criticism of the proposed expansion of the private
cause of action is that private action alone does not recognize the
problem's scope. The Act's goal is to ensure that Internet users do not
waste time and money sorting through and deleting the multitude of
unwanted email they receive daily.2 2 3 Simply put, no matter what
domestic regulation Congress may adopt to confront spam-private
cause of action or otherwise-unwanted email will still reach users'
inboxes if domestic regulation is the only tool to combat spam.
Spam is an international problem that does not respect
national borders. 224 Even though the United States is by far the
among many victims, and the small size of the individual claims will virtually guarantee that no
legal action will be forthcoming.").
221. Hill, supra note 220, at 152.
222. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011) (noting that commonality "must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke").
223. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(4).
224. SYMANTEC, STATE OF SPAM & PHISHING: A MONTHLY REPORT 7 (Oct. 2011),
http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/SYMCINT2011_10 October FINAL-en.pdf.
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number one source of spam worldwide, about three-quarters of spam
originates outside of this country.225  While there have been
international efforts for cooperation on spam regulation, no
international legal norms or binding agreements yet exist to
effectively prevent the receipt of spam.2 2 6  As a result, true spam
control will require an international effort that includes both the
public and private sectors of the global community, which is beyond
CAN-SPAM's scope. Without such international controls, there is a
possibility that spam operations will simply move to other countries
with weaker regulations than an improved CAN-SPAM Act. 2 2 7
IV. CONCLUSION: PRIVATE ACTION IS JUST ONE ARROW IN THE QUIVER
The CAN-SPAM Act, in its current form, has done very little to
shift the cost of each marginal email onto the spammer.228 Spam only
increased since Congress passed the Act.2 2 9  That much spam
originates outside of US borders does not imply that domestic
regulation should remain in its weakened form. The United States
accounts for roughly one third of all spam worldwide. 230 Effective
domestic action is better than no action in the absence of an
international agreement, even if it is not a perfect solution. So long as
the CAN-SPAM Act remains the near-exclusive enforcement authority
for unsolicited spam, a private cause of action would promote its goals
by deterring a critical mass of spammers from sending their unwanted
messages-something the current CAN-SPAM Act simply does not do.
David J. Rutenberg*
225. Id. The United States accounts for 34 percent of spam, while India, the second
largest source of spam, generates 5.8 percent. Id.
226. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185 (Council of Eur.),
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